We measure arbitrage trading on both the long-and the short-sides by merging hedge fund equity holdings with short interest. Over time, aggregate hedge fund holdings track aggregate short interest well, and both have grown dramatically since the early 1990s. In the cross section, the difference between abnormal hedge fund holdings and abnormal short interest, which captures net arbitrage trading activity on a stock, strongly predicts future stock returns. When examining a broad set of asset pricing anomalies, we find anomaly returns to come exclusively from about 30% of the anomaly stocks that are traded by arbitrageurs. These stocks are also hard to arbitrage on average. Overall, our findings confirm that mispricing arises from limits to arbitrage and arbitrage trading is informative about mispricing.
Introduction
Arbitrageurs play a crucial role in finance. By simultaneously taking long and short positions in different assets, they help to eliminate relative mispricing and therefore enforce market efficiency. As a result, their trading pins down the expected return on these assets, according to the seminal arbitrage pricing theory (APT) of Ross (1976) . On the other hand, investors' behavioral biases may lead to persistent mispricing when arbitrageurs face limits-to-arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
among others).
Tracking arbitrage trading has been a challenging empirical task due to the lack of data on arbitrageurs. In recent years, as hedge funds emerge as a group of likely arbitrageurs and their stock holdings data become available, a series of papers have inferred the long-side of arbitrage trading by investigating their quarterly holdings (e.g., Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) , Griffin and Xu (2009), Cao, Chen, Goetzmann, and Liang (2014) ). At the same time, short sellers are often considered as informed traders (e.g., Desai, Ramesh, Thiagarajan, and Balachandran (2002) and Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) ). Since short positions are involved in an arbitrage trade, several researchers have started to track the short-side of arbitrage trading by examining short interest on stocks over time (see Hanson and Sunderam (2014) , Hwang and Liu (2014) , Wu and Zhang (2014) , among others).
The innovation of our paper is to combine hedge fund holdings on the long-side with the short interest on the short-side to infer the net arbitrage trading on a stock. The advantage of our approach is straightforward. A correctly priced stock can be traded by arbitrageurs for hedging purpose. It might be bought in some arbitrage transactions and sold short in others. Alternatively, arbitrageurs may disagree on the valuation of a stock, and thus some may purchase it while others sell it short. At the end of 2012, there are more than 2,300 stocks with both hedge fund holdings and short interest and they cover more than 90% of the U.S. equity universe in terms of market capitalization. For these stocks, focusing on either the long-side or the short-side alone will give imprecise inference about arbitrageurs' view on the stocks in aggregate. However, the net position should represent a better proxy for arbitrage trading and a more powerful predictor of future stock returns. Indeed, we confirm this conjecture in our empirical analysis. In particular, we find that stocks with large hedge fund holdings but simultaneously heavy short interest do not earn any abnormal return in the future.
We combine a comprehensive dataset on hedge funds' quarterly holdings with data on short interest during the period from 1990 to 2012.
1 Over time, aggregate hedge fund holdings track aggregate short interest well, and both experienced exponential growth since the early 1990s
as plotted in Figure 1 . The percentages of shares outstanding that are held by hedge funds or sold short are both less than 1% in earlier 1990s but peak around 5% in 2008 before levering off afterwards. The common trend shared by both the long-and the short-side of arbitrage trading confirms the increasing arbitrage activities documented by Hanson and Sunderam (2014) who use only short interest. Even in the cross section, we find similar distribution in hedge fund holdings and short interest. For example, these two values exhibit similar means (3.72% vs. 3.49%), medians (2.37% vs. 2.35%), and standard deviations (3.97% vs. 3.66%) across stocks. The similarity in their distributions supports the notion that on average, hedge fund holdings and short interest reveal the two legs of the same arbitrage trade.
Stocks can be held by hedge funds or sold short for many reasons other than arbitrage. For example, hedge funds may hold certain stocks to neutralize portfolio risk. Stocks may be sold short to hedge against a convertible bond purchase. To better measure arbitrage trading, we define abnormal hedge fund holding (AHF) and abnormal short interest (ASR) as their values in the current quarter minus their moving averages in the four prior quarters. Figure 2 shows that, at the aggregate level, AHF and ASR track each other well. This is particularly true during crisis periods when mispricing is prevalent. Finally, AHFSR, defined as the difference between AHF and ASR, is our net arbitrage trading measure which captures trade imbalance of arbitrageurs. For example, an AHFSR of 1% (-1%) on a stock means that arbitrageurs, as a group, have purchased (sold) and additional 1% of the stock during the most recent quarter relative to their past averages.
Consistent with the existing literature, we find both abnormal hedge fund holding (AHF) and abnormal short interest (ASR) to predict returns. On the long-side, stocks in the highest AHF quintile outperform those in the lowest quintile by 0.44% per month in the next quarter. On the short-side, stocks in the highest ASR quintile underperform those in the lowest quintile by 0.41%
per month in the next quarter. Most important, by focusing on net arbitrage trading, AHFSR generates the highest return spread in the same sample. 2 Stocks in the highest AHFSR quintile outperform those in the lowest quintile by 0.68% per month in the next quarter. The return spread is highly significant (t-value = 7.93) but declines quickly over time. It drops to 0.42% per month in the second quarter and further to 0.18% per month in the third. The finding suggests that arbitrage is effective in eliminating mispricing.
The strong return predictability of our net arbitrage trading measure (AHFSR) holds in a battery of robustness checks. We obtain similar results when we restrict both hedge fund holdings and short interest to be strictly positive (i.e., excluding zero values) and when we include small stocks in the sample. Further, the return predictability is not explained away by the common risk factors. It is equally strong during the first and second half of our sample period. It also survives Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions that control for other well-known stock return predictors.
2 In a contemporaneous study, Jiao, Massa, and Zhang (2015) also find that an increase (decrease) in hedge fund holdings accompanied with a decrease (increase) in short interest is informative about future stock return and firm fundamental. They do not define AHFSR and relate it to arbitrage trading and asset pricing anomalies as we focus on in our paper.
The advantage of our net arbitrage trading measure can also be illustrated by a double sort on AHF and ASR. Holding one variable constant, sorting on the second variable still generates large and significant return spreads, suggesting that arbitrage activities on both legs are informative. Interestingly, we find stocks with high-AHF-high-ASR to have about the same future returns as stocks with low-AHF-low-ASR, confirming that future returns are really driven by the net arbitrage trading activity. Finally and not surprisingly, stocks with high-AHF-low-ASR earn much higher future returns than stocks with low-AHF-high-ASR (1.18% vs. 0.40% per month).
Next, after showing that AHFSR captures arbitrage trading well, we apply it to investigate asset pricing anomalies in the cross section. We examine a total of 10 well-known asset pricing anomalies: the book-to-market ratio (BM) of Fama and French (2008) , the gross profitability (GP) Fama and French (2008) and net operating assets (NOA) of Hirshleifer et al. (2004) . We verify that the long-minus-short future return spreads averaged across these 10 anomalies are positive and significant in our sample. The return spreads are 0.28%, 0.25%, 0.20%, and 0.15% per month during the first, second, third, and fourth quarters, respectively.
3
More important, the anomaly returns are completely driven by about 30% of stocks in the long and short portfolios that are traded by the arbitrageurs. We classify an anomaly stock to be traded by the arbitrageurs if (1) it is in the long portfolio and recent bought by arbitrageurs (its AHFSR belongs to the top 30%) or (2) it is in the short portfolio and recently sold short by arbitrageurs (its AHFSR belongs to the bottom 30%). This subset of anomaly stocks earn return spreads of 0.88%, 0.61%, 0.34%, and 0.27% per month during the first, second, third, and fourth 3 The magnitude is smaller compared to other studies since we use quintile sort instead of the more common decile sort and we exclude small stocks from our main sample.
quarters, respectively, after portfolio formation. In sharp contrast, the other 70% of anomaly stocks that are not traded by arbitrageurs do not earn any significant return spreads in the next four quarters. The fact that abnormal future returns only appear among anomaly stocks traded by the arbitrageurs and these abnormal returns decline quickly during the first year suggests that arbitrageurs are effective in eliminating mispricing.
We then examine stock characteristics that are related to limits-to-arbitrage. We find that anomaly stocks that are not traded by arbitrageurs in general are easy to arbitrage: they have lower idiosyncratic volatility, higher stock price and are more liquid. Since they are easy to arbitrage, they are unlikely to be mispriced, consistent with their lack of abnormal future returns. Overall, our findings confirm that mispricing arises from limits-to-arbitrage and arbitrage trading is informative about mispricing.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that studies hedge fund holdings and short interest as return predictors and proxies for arbitrageurs' activities. Chen, Goetzmann, and Liang (2014) find that, compared with other institutional investors, hedge funds hold and trade mispriced stocks, and mispriced stocks with higher hedge fund ownership realize higher future returns and are more likely to get mispricing corrected. Reca, Sias, and Turtle (2015) also find that hedge fund demand shocks predict future stock returns.
There is also a large body of literature that examines the information embedded in short interest. Prior research has studied, both theoretically and empirically, the impact of short sales on security returns. Miller (1977) argues that in the presence of heterogeneous beliefs, binding short sale constraints prevent stock prices from fully reflecting negative opinions of pessimistic trades, leading to overpricing and low subsequent returns. Diamond and Verrecchia (1987) show that given the high costs (i.e., no access to proceeds) of short selling, short sales are more likely to be informative trades. Consistent with these theories, several empirical papers document a negative association between short interest and abnormal stock return (e.g., Asquith and Meulbroek 1995; Desai et al., 2002; and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang, 2008) . Using institutional ownership of stocks as a proxy for stock loan supply, Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) and Nagel (2005) examine the impact of short sale constraints on stock returns. Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter (2005) find that for small stocks with high short interest, low institutional ownership is associated with more negative future returns, which confirms the effect of binding short constraints on stock prices. However, they show that only 5% of the stocks trading on the NYSE, Amex, and Nasdaq have institutional ownership smaller than short interest, suggesting that short sale constraints are not pervasive.
Nagel (2005) finds that short sale constraints help explain several cross-sectional stock return anomalies related to book-to-market ratio, analyst forecast dispersion, turnover, and return volatility. More recently, Drechsler and Drechsler (2014) find that short-rebate fee is a more informative signal about overpricing and arbitrageurs' trading on the short-leg.
To our best knowledge, our paper is the first to combine information about arbitrageurs' trading on both the long-and the short-side. Different from prior research that focuses on either the long-or the short-side, our study provides a more complete view about the effect of arbitrageurs' trading activities. We propose a simple measure of the net arbitrage trading. We find this net arbitrage trading measure to better predict future returns. When using the measure to study well-known return anomalies, we find strong and direct evidence supporting the notion that mispricing arises from limits-to-arbitrage and arbitrage trading is informative about mispricing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and sample.
Section 3 examines our net arbitrage trading measure (AHFSR) as a stock return predictor. Section 4 uses AHFSR to study asset pricing anomalies. Section 5 concludes.
Data and Sample Construction
We start our sample in 1990 as hedge fund holding and short interest data are relatively sparse before that. 5 At the end of each quarter, we exclude from our main sample stocks with a price of less than $5 per share and a market capitalization of less than the 20 th percentile of NYSE size breakpoint. We exclude small stocks and penny stocks from our main analysis for two reasons.
First, hedge funds only need to report common stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. As a result, hedge fund holdings on small stocks and penny stocks are often underestimated. Second, excluding these stocks helps to alleviate the associated market microstructure noise. Our final sample still represents over 85% of the CRSP universe on average.
Hedge Fund Holdings
Our data on equity holdings of hedge funds are identical to that used in Cao, Chen, Goetzmann, and Liang (2014) . The data are constructed by manually matching the Thomson Reuters 13F institutional ownership database with a comprehensive list of the names of hedge fund companies. The hedge fund company names are collected from six hedge fund databases, including TASS, HFR, CISDM, Bloomberg, Barclay Hedge, and Morningstar databases, augmented with additional sources. Hedge funds, as private investment vehicles, were historically exempt from registering with the SEC as an investment company. However, similar to other institutional investors, hedge fund management companies with more than $100 million in assets under management are required to file quarterly reports disclosing their holdings of registered equity securities. Common stock positions greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value are subject to disclosure. As a result of this reporting requirement, hedge fund holdings of small stocks are likely to be neglected in the reporting, and thus excluding small stocks from our main analysis helps to alleviate this bias. 13F filings contain long positions in stocks while short equity positions are not required to be reported.
In our study, a hedge fund is defined as a management company included in a hedge fund database, a firm that self-identifies as a hedge fund, or a firm that imposes a threshold of high-networth investors and a performance-based compensation. After collecting a list of hedge fund company names from various sources, we match them with institution names in the 13F data. To address the fact that a hedge fund manager may not appear in any hedge fund databases because of the voluntary nature of reporting to a hedge fund database, a manually checking is used based on a variety of online resources. Further, following Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004) and Griffin and Xu (2009), each identified company is manually checked to ensure that hedge fund management is its primary business using two criteria: first, more than 50% of its clients are either high-net-worth individuals or invested in "other pooled investment vehicle (e.g., hedge funds)", and second, the adviser is compensated by a performance-based fee. Our final sample of hedge fund companies includes 1,517 hedge fund management firms that collectively manage over 5,000
individual hedge funds.
For each stock in our sample, we then compute its quarterly hedge fund holdings (HF) as the number of shares held by all hedge funds at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of shares outstanding. If the stock is not held by even a single hedge fund in that quarter, its HF is set to zero. Since stocks can be held by hedge funds for reasons other than arbitrage (to neutralize portfolio risk from a short position), to better measure hedge fund trading, we define abnormal hedge fund holding (AHF) in the current quarter HF minus the average HF in the past four quarters. For each stock in our sample, we compute its quarterly short interest (SR) as the number of shares sold short at the end of the quarter divided by the total number of shares outstanding. If the stock is not covered by our short interest files, its SR is set to zero. Again, we define abnormal short interest (ASR) in the current quarter HF minus the average SR in the past four quarters.
Short Interest

Asset Pricing Anomalies
We consider 10 well-documented popular anomalies largely following Fama and French (2008) and Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan (2012) , in our investigation of the relation of hedge fund holdings and short interest to anomalous stock returns.
The first anomaly is the book-to-market ratio (BM) of Fama and French (1996, 2008) . It is well known that firms with higher book-to-market ratio have higher returns in the future and these returns do not disappear after adjusting risk using the CAPM of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) .
The second anomaly is the operating profit (OP) of Fama and French (2015) , who show that firms with higher operating profits have higher future returns. The third anomaly is the gross profitability (GP) of Novy-Marx (2013) , who shows that firms with higher gross profit have higher future returns. The fourth anomaly is the momentum (MOM) of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . In our setting, at the end of each quarter, we compute firm returns in the past 13 months by skipping the immediate month prior to the end of the quarter, divide them into winners and losers, and hold them in the next quarter. The fifth anomaly is the market capitalization (MC) of Fama and French (1996, 2008) . On average, the larger the firm size, the lower its expected return. This size anomaly, similar to the book-to-market ratio anomaly, has a long history, survives the CAPM risk adjustment, and has been proposed as a factor in the three-factor model of Fama and French (1996) , the five-factor model of Fama and French (2015) , and the four-factor model of Hou, Xue, and
Zhang ( Details of anomaly construction are in appendix A.
For each anomaly, we construct quintile portfolios at the end of each quarter. We then compute the monthly long-minus-short portfolio return spreads for the next quarter.
Sample Description
After excluding small stocks and penny stocks, our baseline sample contains about 1,600 stocks per quarter. As shown in Figure 1 (a), the number of stocks started around 1,400 in 1990, reached a peak of 2,000 during the Tech bubble, and then leveled off to 1,400 again afterwards.
Since only small stocks and penny stocks are excluded, our baseline sample still covers more than 86% of the CRSP universe in terms of market capitalization. An aggregate AHFSR of 1% (-1%) means that arbitrageurs, as a group, have purchased (sold) an additional 1% of the market during the most recent quarter relative to the average of the previous four quarters. We find aggregate AHFSR to fluctuate between -0.5% and 0.5% most of the time.
One exceptionally large value (below -1%) of AHFSR occurred during late 2008 as arbitrageurs were fleeing the market due to funding liquidity constraints. to isolate the net trading on the long-and short-side. When we examine the correlations among AHF, ASR and AHFSR, we find AHFSR to be positively correlated with AHF (0.64) and negatively correlated with ASR (-0.68). These correlations are far from being perfect, suggesting that the net arbitrage trading is quite different from the arbitrage trading on either the long-or the short-side.
Arbitrage Trading and Future Returns
Since the majority of stocks are both held by hedge funds and simultaneously sold short, we argue that the net arbitrage trading between the long-and the short-side should be a more powerful predictor of future stock returns. In this section, we test the predictor power of our measure of net arbitrage trading for stock returns.
Portfolio sorts
We first examine whether net arbitrage capital forecasts future stock returns using a portfolio formation approach. Our hedge fund holding data is at quarterly frequency, hence we form portfolios at the end of each quarter and track portfolio returns in the following quarters.
Specifically, at the end of each quarter, we rank stocks in our baseline sample based on their values of AHF, ASR or AHFSR, and assign them into quintiles. The lowest quintile includes stocks that have low values of AHF, ASR or AHFSR, and the highest quintile includes stocks that have high values of AHF, ASR and AHFSR. After the formation of the portfolios, we track the excess returns of each portfolio in the following quarters. We compute the excess return of a portfolio by equally averaging excess returns of all stocks that belong to that portfolio in that quarter. We first present the excess returns of these quintile portfolios, and then adjust risk exposures to the three factors of Fama and French (1996) , the three factors of Fama and French augmented with the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and the five factors of Fama and French (2015) , which expand their original three factors to include a profitability factor and an asset growth factor. Table 2 presents results from portfolio formation. Table 2A presents (or, about 8.2% per year) with a t-value of 7.93. Therefore, the return spread is both economically and statistically significant.
Next, we discuss alphas (i.e., risk-adjusted returns) of these quintile portfolios. The alphas seem to be large in magnitude at extreme quintiles. This is especially true for stocks that have high AHF and stocks that have high ASR. In particular, for the three asset pricing models we consider, high AHF stocks have alphas of 0.28% (t-value = 3.11), 0.34% (t-value = 3.92), and 0.19% (tvalue = 2.12), while high ASR stocks have alphas of -0.32% (t-value = -3.09), -0.17% (t-value = -1.91), and -0.35% (t-value = -3.31), respectively. This is not too surprising, since both hedge fund holdings variable (HF) and the short interest variable (SR) are bounded below by zero, and thus an increase in HF or SR tends to be more informative than a decrease.
When AHF and ASR are combined into AHFSR, alphas are large in magnitude for both high and low AHFSR portfolios. High AHFSR stocks have alphas of 0.36%, 0.42%, and 0.27%, and low AHFSR stocks have alphas of -0.34%, -0.22%, -0.38%, respectively. The alphas of highminus-low portfolios are also larger and statistically significant for the AHFSR portfolio when comparing to those of AHF and ASR portfolios. Across the three factor models, the alphas of Further, we track the excess returns of these quintile portfolios in subsequent quarters in addition to the immediate following quarter. 7 In panel D, the variable Q1 indicates the high-minuslow return in the next quarter, the variable Q2 indicates the high-minus-low returns in the second quarter after portfolio formation, and the variable Q3 indicated high-minus-low returns in the third quarter after portfolio formation, and so on. Our results show that, for all three measures of arbitrage capital, excess returns decrease over time. The high-minus-low excess returns from AHFSR quintile portfolio is the largest at 0.68% per month in the immediate following quarter after portfolio formation. It drops to 0.42% in the second quarter after portfolio formation, further drops to 0.18% in the third quarter after portfolio formation, and finally drops to zero in the fourth quarter after portfolio formation. Overall, the results confirm that net arbitrage trading consistently predicts future return better than arbitrage activities on either the long-side or the short-side alone.
The fact that these abnormal returns decline quickly during the first year suggests that arbitrageurs are effective in eliminating mispricing. So far we have assumed AHF and ASR to be comparable so that a simple difference between them produces a measure of net arbitrage trading. The assumption seems reasonable given that AHF and ASR have similar distributions in the cross-section (see Table 1A ). Nevertheless, to account for the possibility that the true net arbitrage trading could be a nonlinear function in both AHF and ASR, we consider an alternative approach to examine the incremental contribution of AHF or ASR by performing two-dimensional independent sorting based on AHF and ASR.
At the end of each quarter, in our base sample, we form tercile portfolios based on AHF, and independently form tercile portfolios based on ASR. Then, nine AHF-ASR portfolios are taken from the intersections of these two sets of tercile portfolios. Our premise is that, in the high AHF tercile, some stocks may have high ASR, but other stocks may have low ASR. Similarly, in the low AHF tercile, some stocks may have low ASR, but other stocks may have high ASR. However, we posit that it is the net value that should matter. Specifically, the excess return of stocks that have both high AHF and high ASR is 0.81%, while it is 0.71% for stocks that have both low AHF and low ASR. Their corresponding alphas are both very close to zero, exactly as one would expect if it is the net arbitrage trading that really matters. In sharp contrast, the excess returns are 1.18%
for stocks that have high AHF and low ASR, and 0.40% for stocks that have high ASR and low AHF. Therefore, the double-sort results provide strong support that the net arbitrage trading is the driving force of the predictability for future stock returns.
To summarize, some arbitrage capital buys a stock for some reason, and at the same time, while other arbitrage capital sells short the same stock for other reasons. Therefore, it would be incomplete to rely on only one side of the arbitrage capital to infer about arbitrageurs' views on future stock returns, and thus it is crucial to consider both hedge fund holdings (the long-side) and short interest (the short-side).
Cross-Sectional Regressions
Although intuitive, as discussed in Fama and French (2008) , it is difficult for the portfolio approach to identify which variable has unique information in predicting future excess returns, Meanwhile, a one standard deviation increase in AHF is associated with 0.45% increase in excess return in the next quarter, and a one standard deviation increase in ASR is associated with 0.44% decrease in excess return in the next quarter. Therefore, combing information in AHF and ASR leads to greater forecasting power for future stock returns.
Next, we restrict our sample to including only stocks that have positive hedge fund holdings and short interest, and break our base sample into two equal sub-samples and repeat the FamaMacbeth regressions. These similar results are presented in the second, third and right-most blocks of Table 3 , respectively. As can be seen, our results hold in these alternative sensitivity tests.
A number of control variables are included in the Fama and MacBeth regressions. Overall, regression coefficients on the control variables have correct signs, but many of these control variables are statistically insignificant. Apart from the NYSE size filter and $5 price filter we apply, a possible explanation is that these anomalies compete with each other and render each other insignificance. For example, AG competes with IK, and OP competes with GP. It is not surprising that each of these variables by themselves can be significant. The other possible explanation is the sample period we use. In our sample from 1990 to 2012, the value spread from Kenneth French is indeed small at 0.25% per month. During the period, momentum trading strategy suffers from a crash in the first half of 2009. In fact, momentum is highly significant in the first half of our sample (the third block) but insignificant in the second half of our sample (the fourth block). Combined, momentum is insignificant in predicting future excess returns in our sample. Intriguingly, net operating asset is significant in our base sample. Nevertheless, further check reveals that it is only significant in the first half of our base sample.
In sum, performing the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions, we show that net trading activity of arbitrageurs as proxied by AHFSR strongly forecasts future stock returns compared to what either the long-side AHF or the short-side ASR predicts. The predictability of AHFSR is over and above that of many other firm-level variables that can potentially forecast stock returns as well.
Arbitrage Trading and Asset Pricing Anomalies
If AHFSR measures net arbitrage trading activity, we could use it to reveal more insights on how arbitrageurs trade on well-known return anomalies in the cross-section. As detailed in Section 2.3, we examine a total of 10 anomalies, namely the book-to-market ratio (BM), the gross profitability (GP), operating profit (OP), momentum (MOM), market capitalization (MC), asset growth (AG), investment-to-capital ratio (IK), net stock issue (NS), accrual (AC), and net operating assets (NOA). Table 4A Panel A verifies that the long-minus-short future return spreads averaged across these 10 anomalies are positive and significant in our sample. The monthly return spreads are 0.28% (t-value = 3.47), 0.25% (t-value = 3.19), 0.20% (t-value = 2.48), and 0.15% (t-value = 1.97) per month during the first, second, third, and fourth quarters, respectively. The magnitude is somewhat smaller compared to previous studies since we use quintile sorts instead of the more common decile sorts and we exclude small stocks from our main sample. Sample period is also likely to play a role. For example, it is well known that the size premium has largely disappeared after the 1980s. The value spread is only 0.18% per month in our sample, and the value spread from Kenneth French's website is also small at 0.25% per month in the same period and the difference is driven by small stocks that are excluded from our sample. Our sample period also includes the 2009 momentum crash, explaining a smaller momentum profit. Not surprisingly, when we control for return factors constructed based on some of the anomalies, the resulting average five-factor alphas become smaller. They are 0.14%, 0.13%, 0.11%, and 0.08% per month during the first, second, third, and fourth quarters, respectively. The average alphas are still significant during the first two quarters after portfolio formation as shown in Panel A of Table 4B .
In addition, consistent with the findings in Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012), most of the anomaly alphas are coming from the short leg since overpricing is harder for to arbitrage away due to the short-sale constraints.
We then identify stocks in the long-and short-anomaly portfolios that are also traded by the arbitrageurs in the same direction. We classify an anomaly stock to be traded by the arbitrageurs if it is in the long portfolio and recently bought by arbitrageurs (its AHFSR belongs to the top 30%), or it is in the short portfolio and recently sold short (its AHFSR belongs to the bottom 30%). Table 4C shows that these stocks account for only about 30% of both the long-and the short-portfolio. Strikingly, the anomaly returns are completely driven by these stocks that are traded by the arbitrageurs. As shown in Panel B of Table 4A , this subset of anomaly stocks earn return spreads of 0.88% (t-value = 7.10), 0.61% (t-value = 4.88), 0.34% (t-value = 2.68), and 0.27% (t-value = 2.18) per month during the first, second, third, and fourth quarters, respectively.
The corresponding five-factor alphas are 0.70% (t-value = 6.31), 0.45% (t-value = 3.90), 0.25% (t-value = 1.98), and 0.22% (t-value = 1.73). Hence, the alpha shows a quick decline over time during the first year. When we examine the alphas on the long-and short-legs separately, we again find the alphas to mostly come from the short-leg. While the alpha on the long-leg is small and significant only in the first quarter, the alpha more than doubles on the short-leg and persists for a longer time.
In sharp contrast, the other 70% of anomaly stocks that are not traded by arbitrageurs do not earn any significant return spreads or alphas in any of the next four quarters as reported in Panel C of Table 4A . This is true for both the long-and the short-legs. The fact that future abnormal returns only appear among anomaly stocks traded by the arbitrageurs and these abnormal returns decline quickly during the first year suggests that arbitrageurs are effective in eliminating mispricing. 8 A close examination of Tables 4A and 4B confirms Table 5 reports results of the comparisons. Across almost all the anomalies and for both the long-and the short-portfolios, anomaly stocks that are traded have significantly lower prices, have significantly higher idiosyncratic volatilities, and are significantly more illiquid according to the Amihud measure. Pontiff (1996) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that idiosyncratic volatility is a major arbitrage cost. In addition, it is well known that hedge funds often hold illiquidity assets (e.g., Getmansky, Lo, and Marakov (2004)). The evidence is consistent with a notion that the anomaly stocks are harder to arbitrage, explaining why they are mispriced to start with.
Taken together, we find that net arbitrage activity contains useful prospective information about stock returns. Furthermore, anomaly stocks have large arbitrage costs, and their anomalous returns are significantly associated with net arbitrage activity. These findings confirm that mispricing arises from limits-to-arbitrage and arbitrage trading is informative about mispricing.
Conclusion
Arbitrageurs play a crucial role in finance, but measuring their activities has been a challenge empirically. By merging a comprehensive dataset on hedge funds' quarterly holdings with data on short interest, we track arbitrage trading on both the long-and the short-sides. Over time, aggregate hedge fund holdings track aggregate short interest well and both experienced fast growth since the early 1990s. In the cross section, the difference between abnormal hedge fund holding and abnormal short interest, which captures the net arbitrage trading activities on a stock, strongly predicts its next-quarter return. When examining a broad set of asset pricing anomalies, we find anomaly returns to come exclusively from about 30% of the anomaly stocks that are traded by arbitrageurs. These stocks are also harder to arbitrage on average. Overall, our findings confirm that mispricing arises from limits-to-arbitrage and arbitrage trading is informative about mispricing.
Our simple measure of arbitrage trading can be applied in many other applications. For example, one could relate the arbitrage trading on an anomaly to its future performance. One could examine the return spread between stocks with high-and low-AHFSR as a pricing factor in the spirit of the original Arbitrage Pricing Theory. We leave these and other interesting applications for future research.
Appendix: Details of the Construction of Anomalies.
This appendix provides details on the constructions of the 10 anomalies we examine in the (2013), we measure gross profits-toassets at year t-1 as gross profit at year t-1 (Compustat item GP) divided by total assets at year t-1 (AT). Titman (1993) . At the end of March, June, September and December (time t), we compute each stock's cumulative return from month t-13 to t-2, and form quintile portfolios for the next three months. We compute equalweighted monthly returns in each portfolio for month t+1 to t+3, and the portfolio is rebalanced at the end of month t+3. (2008), ME is defined as the market capitalization at the end of June in each year. It is the product of number of shares and shares outstanding from the CRSP. This ME covers the following four quarters. (2008), we compute asset growth at year t-1 as total assets (AT) for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 divided by total assets for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-2, minus one.
Gross Profit to Asset (GP). Following Novy-Marx
Operating Profit (OP
Momentum (MOM). Following Jegadeesh and
Market Capitalization (ME). Following Fama and French
Asset Growth (AG). Following Cooper, Gulen and Schill
Investment growth (IK). Following Xing (2008), we measure investment growth for year
t-1 as the growth rate in capital expenditure (CAPX) from the fiscal year ending in calendar year t−2 to the fiscal year ending in t−1. (2008) This table presents summary statistics for the following variables: hedge fund holdings (HF), defined as the ratio between shares owned by hedge funds and the number of outstanding shares; short ratio (SR), defined as the ratio between shares shorted and the number of shares outstanding; the difference between HF and SR (HFSR), abnormal hedge fund holdings (AHF), defined as the percentage change of current HF from the average of HF in the previous four quarters; abnormal short ratio (ASR), defined as the percentage change of current SR from the average of SR in the previous four quarters; the difference between AHF and ASR (AHFSR). The summary statistics include the mean, 5 percentile, 25 percentile, median, 75 percentile, 95 percentile, and standard deviations (P5, P25, P50, P75, P95, STD). Monthly stock returns are from the CRSP. Annual accounting data used for the calculation of characteristics are from the COMPUSTAT. The characteristics of each firm from the July of year t to the June of year t+1 are based on its accounting information of the last fiscal year that ends in calendar year t-1. At the end of each quarter, we delete firms whose market capitalizations are below the 20 percentile market capitalization of NYSE firms, which are available at the website of Kenneth French. In panel A, at the end of each quarter, we first compute the above statistics across firms, and then take average across quarters. % of CRSP represents the total market capitalization of our sample as a portion of the market capitalization of the full CRSP universe. In panel B, at the end of each quarter, we compute the correlations between HF, SR, HFSR, AHF, ASR, AHFSR and firm characteristics, and present average correlations over quarters. We consider the following characteristics: the book-to-market ratio ( Table 2 .
Net Stock Issue (NS). Following Fama and French
Returns and Alphas of Portfolios Formed on Arbitrage Capital
At the end of each quarter, we form quintile portfolios based on AHF, ASR, or AHFSR, and track each portfolio's monthly excess returns in the next quarter, which are the equal-weighted average of excess returns of firms in each portfolio. Quintile 5 has the highest AHF, ASR or AHFSR. We adjust risk exposure using the three factors of Fama and French (1996) , the Fama-French three factor and the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and the five factors of Fama and French (2015) , and they are labelled as FF3, FF4 and FF5 respectively. Panel A presents results from portfolios formed on AHF, panel B presents results from portfolios formed on ASR, panel C presents results from portfolios formed on AHFSR, panel D presents excess returns of these portfolios in the future quarters that span the next four quarters. The left panel presents excess returns and alphas, and the right panel presents their t-values. Table 2A uses our base sample from 1990/01 to 2012/12, which deletes the firms whose market capitalizations are below the NYSE 20 percentile size breakpoints. Table 2B presents results from using a sample before applying the 20 percentile NYSE size breakpoints. Table 2C uses firms that have non-zero HF and SR in our base sample. Table 2D uses the first half of our sample. Table 2E uses the second half of our sample. Table 2F presents results from tercile portfolios independently formed on AHF and ASR in our base sample. Excess Returns are in percentages. Factors data are obtain from the webpage of Kenneth French. (2008) and net operating assets (NOA) of Hirshleifer et al. (2004) . We take logs of BM and MC.
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Monthly stock returns are from the CRSP and are compounded into quarterly returns. Annual accounting data used for the calculation of control variables are from the COMPUSTAT. These characteristics of each firm from the July of year t to the June of year t+1 are based on its accounting information of the last fiscal year that ends in calendar year t-1. For each anomaly variable, at the end of each quarter, we construct quintile portfolios and compute monthly portfolio returns in the next four quarters (Q1, Q2, Q3 and Q4). LMS (Panel A) is the return difference between the long leg and short leg. Meanwhile, we independently form three AHFSR portfolios using 30% and 70% AHFSR cutoff values. At the end of each quarter, in the long leg, we identify firms that belong to the AHFSR group 3 (Trading) and firms that do not belong to AHFSR group 3 (Not Trading). Similarly, in the short leg, we identify those firms that belong to the AHFSR group 1 (Trading) and those firms that do not belong to the AHFSR group 1 (Not Trading). We track the monthly equal-weighted averages of these four portfolios. Return of trading (Panel B) is defined as the return difference between the returns of the long leg and the short leg when arbitrage capital trades, and return of not trading (Panel C) is defined as the return difference between the returns of the long leg and short leg when arbitrage capital does not trade. The difference between the group of trading and not trading is in Panel D. The upper table (Table 4A ) presents returns. The middle table (Table 4b ) presents associated t-values. The bottom table (Table 4C ) presents, for each anomaly, the total number of stocks on the long or short leg, the numbers and proportions of stocks that are traded by the arbitrage capital on the long and short leg, in our sample. Column "Avg." represents results from a portfolio that invests equally across 10 anomalies. We also report the alpha of the long-minusshort of these composite portfolios, Alpha (LMS), from using the Fama-French (2015) five factor model, the alphas of the long composite portfolio and short portfolio, Alpha(L) and Alpha(S). We consider the following anomalies: the book-to-market ratio (BM) of Fama and French (2008) At the end of each quarter, on the long leg of each anomaly, we identify a portfolio of stocks that have high AHFSR ranking and these stocks are treated as the group of traded; we also identify a portfolio of stocks that does not have the high AHFSR rankings, and this is the group of stocks that are not traded. For these two portfolios, we compute portfolio-level price, idiosyncratic volatility, and he Amihud (2002) measure, by equal averaging across stocks in each portfolio. The Amihud measure is transformed into percentiles among NYSE/AMEX or NASDAQ firms separately. Panel A presents the difference of these characteristics (Price, IVOL, the Amihud measure) between the "Trading" portfolio and "Not Trading" portfolio for the short-leg of each anomaly, Panel B repeats this analysis for the long-leg, and panels C and D report associated t-values. At the end of each quarter, we count the number of firms that have larger than zero values of HF, larger than zero values of SR, larger than zero values of HF and SR, and the total number of firms in our base sample, and plot them over quarters in the upper figure. We compute the market capitalization of these firms as a proportion of the market capitalization of the CRSP universe, and plot them in the bottom figure. Our sample does not include firms whose market capitalization is less than 20% size percentile of the NYSE firms. The sample is quarterly from 1990 to 2012.
Figure 2. Aggregate Variables about Hedge Fund Holdings and Short Interest
We plot value-weighted averages of the following variables: hedge fund holdings (HF), defined as the ratio between shares owned by hedge funds and the number of outstanding shares; short ratio (SR), defined as the ratio between shares shorted and the number of shares outstanding; the difference between HF and SR (HFSR), abnormal hedge fund holdings (AHF), defined as the percentage change of current HF from the average of HF in the previous four quarters; abnormal short ratio (ASR), defined as the percentage change of current SR from the average of SR in the previous four quarters; the difference between AHF and ASR (AHFSR). The sample is quarterly from 1990 to 2012. 0.07 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 1 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 5 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 7 1 9 9 8 1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1 2 0 1 2 Value (a) Aggregate HF and SR Aggregate HF Aggregate SR
